Incorporating the Realities of Gender and Power into U.S. Asylum Law Jurisprudence by Lighter, Amy M, Steill
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 
Volume 1 
Issue 3 Spring 2005 Article 5 
February 2014 
Incorporating the Realities of Gender and Power into U.S. Asylum 
Law Jurisprudence 
Amy M. Lighter Steill 
Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lighter, Amy M. Steill (2014) "Incorporating the Realities of Gender and Power into U.S. Asylum Law 
Jurisprudence," Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy: Vol. 1 : Iss. 3 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol1/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Volunteer, Open Access, Library Journals (VOL Journals), 
published in partnership with The University of Tennessee (UT) University Libraries. This article has been accepted 
for inclusion in Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy by an authorized editor. For more information, please visit 
https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp. 
Incorporating the Realities of Gender and Power into U.S. Asylum Law 
Jurisprudence 
Cover Page Footnote 
Joan Fitzpatrick, The Gender Dimension of U.S. Immigration Policy, 9 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 23, 24 
(1997). 
This article is available in Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol1/iss3/5 
GENDER AND ASYLUM
Incorporating the Realities of Gender and Power
into U.S. Asylum Law Jurisprudence
Amy M. Lighter Steill*
I. Introduction ..................................................... 446
II. Asylum Law in the United States .......................... 453
A. History of Refugee Status Based on Gender ...... 455
B. The Current Landscape of U.S. Asylum Law ....... 457
1. Persecution requirement .......................... 458
a. Well-founded Fear ........................................... 459
b. Persecution ............................................... 462
2. The "On Account Of' Requirement ............ 463
3. The State Action Requirement .................. 467
4. The Social Group Requirement .................. 468
C. Limitations of Gender
as a "Particular Social Group ". ........................ 473
III. Linking Gender and Persecution ......................... 477
A. Categories of Violence ................................. 477
B. Categories of Power ................................... 482
1. Dominance-Subjugation and Patriarchy ....... 483
2. Relational Power .................................. 484
3. Legal or Collective Empowerment ............. 487
4. Other Relevant Definitions ...................... 489
IV. Understanding and Utilizing Power Theory in Asylum
A djudication ...................................................... 489
V . C onclusion ................................................... 492
* Amy Lighter Steill works as an assistant public defender in
Knoxville, Tennessee. She is a 2004 graduate of the
University of Tennessee College of Law.
445
1
446 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL. I: 3
Gender is an organizing principle, not a simple
variable, in migration.1
I. Introduction
The Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter
"UNHCR") estimates that 80 percent of the
approximately 40 million refugees and internally
displaced persons are women and children. 2 In
2002, the United States received approximately
81,100 new applications for asylum. If these were
to follow the demographics of refugees as a whole,
nearly 65,000 of those applications would involve
women and children. In light of such striking
numbers, the UNHCR has asserted that "ensuring
equal treatment of refugee women and men may
require specific action in favour of the former.'A
1 Joan Fitzpatrick, The Gender Dimension of U.S. Immigration
Policy, 9 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 23, 24 (1997).
2 Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children,
2001 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals: Women and War
1 (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/GHARkitFilesFeb20O1/wom
an&war.html (last visited April 30, 2004). See also Nancy
Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum
Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625, 625 n. 1 (1993)
(surveying statistics from various sources indicating that,
while precise numbers of female refugees are unknown,
reliable sources indicate that women account for well over half
of all refugees).
3 In addition, about 26,800 refugees resettled in the United
States in 2002. UNHCR, REFUGEES BY NUMBERS 11 (2003),
available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/basics (last
visited May 19, 2004).
4 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive





The U.S. administrative and federal courts
adjudicating asylum petitions have evinced a desire
to make asylum determinations without
consideration of the applicant's gender, 5 but this has
not translated into equal treatment of applicants. In
what may be interpreted more benevolently as a
well-intentioned effort to ensure gender equality by
not overtly "favoring" one gender over the other,
the courts are actually falling prey to what one
commentator labeled a "gender paradox." 6 In other
words, courts are discriminating against one gender
by refusing to acknowledge that issues unique to
one gender require treating its members differently
in the legal context. Despite global advances in the
status of women over the last century, there still
exists a power differential rooted in culture and
gender, which must be taken into account in asylum
decisions if women's asylum applications are to be
adjudicated fairly.7
This Article contends that the only way to
achieve gender parity in asylum adjudication is to
recognize that there are certain inherent differences
in the experiences of women and men seeking
asylum. Furthermore, it is imperative that U.S.
governmental authorities recognize that certain
types of violence that are disproportionately
5 See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
The court notes, "The only distinguishing characteristic about
this case that I can perceive to set it apart from others we
already have decided is that it involves a woman. Reliance
upon such a distinction to support a separate category for
treatment of women's asylum claims, to my mind, would be
impermissible." Id. at 377.
6 Jenny-Brooke Condon, Asylum Law's Gender Paradox, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 207 (2002).
7 For a more detailed discussion of the character and
implications of this power differential, see infra Part III.B.
3
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committed against women can be cognized in the
terms of the asylum statute as currently written,
thereby entitling victims of such violence to
protection under our current asylum laws.
8
To gain asylum under U.S. law, an applicant
must demonstrate her eligibility by demonstrating
several elements outlined in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA").9 She must
demonstrate that she is unwilling or unable to return
to her home country because she has been
persecuted or has a well-founded fear of future
persecution.'° She must also show that she was
8 Although Desir v. lchert, 840 F.2d 723, 726-27 (9th Cir.
1988), held that it is not necessary for asylum that women
have suffered "bodily harm or a threat to life or liberty,"
violence against women is a recurring theme in asylum
applications, and therefore should be defined. For the
purposes of this Article, "violence against women" is defined
in the same way as it is by the UNHCR. In its publication
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Against Refugees,
Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons: Guidelines for





nh 1tnn5Ca2nB 1 GDnn5awDmafDBnGDwccOayo5pcwqnma7
nG5dD5Dzmxwwwwwww 1FqmRbZ/opendoc.pdf
(last visited April 6, 2004) (hereinafter "UNHCR Gender-
Based Violence Guidelines"), the UJNHCR defines "gender-
based violence" as "violence that targets individuals or groups
of individuals on the basis of their gender .... [or] violence
that is directed at a person on the basis of gender or sex" and
"violence against women" as gender-based violence that
"results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual and
psychological harm to women and girls." UNHCR Gender-
Based Violence Guidelines at 10.
9 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A) (codified




targeted for that persecution on account of at least
one of five statutorily protected factors: (1) race, (2)
religion, (3) nationality, (4) political opinion, or (5)
membership in a particular social group." Finally,
she must prove that she was unable or unwilling to
seek protection from the government of her home
country. '
2
Under the current scheme, many women
deserving of asylum are denied relief because their
cases do not to fit within the parameters of the law.
Typically, it is claimed that they do not fit within a
cognizable social group or that they were not
persecuted because of another statutorily recognized
ground for asylum. An exemplary case that has
received a great deal of attention in recent years is
that of Rodi Alvarado.
Alvarado, a Guatemalan, applied for asylum in
the United States after suffering years of continual,
horrific physical and sexual abuse at the hands of
her husband.13 Among many other abuses, he
threatened to cut off her limbs and face with a
machete if she ever attempted to leave him, kicked
her repeatedly in an attempt to abort their second
child, and kicked her genitals with enough force to
cause her to bleed for eight days. 14 The Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") acknowledged that
''a woman [who] chooses the wrong husband" has
few options in Guatemala, where the government
ll Id.
12 Id. See also discussion infra Part II.
" In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908 (B.I.A. 1999).
14 Id. at 908-10. Her husband committed countless offenses
against her catalogued by the BIA, including: raping her
"almost daily," using her head to break mirrors and beat
against furniture, and pistol-whipping her. Id.
5
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has failed to provide resources to deal with the
problem of domestic violence.'
5
Nonetheless, in its 1999 decision, the BIA
reversed the decision of an immigration judge and
denied asylum to Alvarado. The 10-5 majority
reasoned that Alvarado was ineligible for protection
because her situation was essentially personal rather
than political, 16 thus precluding her from fitting into
a social group cognizable under the statute.
17
Deeming that Alvarado's husband's behavior was
"senseless... and irrational ,,,18 the court
attributed Alvarado's abuse to the husband's
"warped perception of and reaction to her behavior.
. psychological disorder, pure meanness, or no
apparent reason at all."'19 In so doing, the BIA
effectively held that, as regrettable as the courts
may find Alvarado's history of abuse, the violence
directed toward Alvarado was ultimately random.
1 Id. at 910.
16 Id. at 916-17. The court reasoned that "there has been no
showing that the respondent's husband targeted any other
women in Guatemala, even though we may reasonably
presume that they, too, did not all share his view of male
domination." Id. at 917.
17 Id. at 917-20. In holding that Alvarado did not fit into any
cognizable social group, the court explained:
[T]he respondent has shown that women living
with abusive partners face a variety of ...
problems in obtaining protection or in leaving
the abusive relationship. But the respondent has
not shown that "Guatemalan women who have
been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions, who believe that women are to live
under male domination" is . . . a recognized






In effect, the courts told Alvarado and other
women fleeing situations of "private" violence that
their cases are simultaneously too narrow and too
broad to fit within the courts' interpretation of the
INA. 20 Their situations are too narrow because they
are considered to be the victims of random violence,
placing them outside the scope of asylum law. The
cases are too broad in the sense that women
suffering domestic abuse fail to fit within a discrete
social group, since domestic violence is framed as a
problem for all women generally. The text of the
INA itself, however, is flexible enough that it does
not have to be interpreted so as to exclude asylum
seekers fleeing this type of violence. As Anita
Sinha put it, "the problem for asylum claims
involving gender-related persecution is in the
20 See, e.g., In re M-S-M- (Immigr. Ct. July 1999), available
at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/summaries/100-
199/summary 1 26.html (holding that because a domestic
abuser had no connection with the Mexican government or
law enforcement, his wife was not "persecuted" for purposes
of the INA); In re D-K- (Immigr. Ct. Dec. 8, 1998), available
at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/ij/1 17.html (rejecting a
battered woman's asylum petition for failing to show "that the
violence against her is related to anything more than evil in the
heart of her husband"); In re F-L-, available at 31 (Immigr.
Ct. July 24, 1998), at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/ij/216.pdf (ruling that
forced prostitution did not constitute persecution); In re A-, at
13 (Immigr. Ct. Jan. 8, 1998), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/chrs/law/ij/263.pdf (finding that
the situation of a woman applying for asylum on the basis that
she feared "a violent attack by the male members of her family
based on her defiance of their wishes that she not marry her
husband" was a "personal family dispute" not covered by the
INA); In re G-R- (Immigr. Ct. Oct. 20, 1997), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/summaries/1 -
50/summary37.html (finding no nexus between domestic
abuse and any enumerated ground for asylum).
7
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interpretation and not the letter of the law."
21
Ultimately, even if an asylum applicant
demonstrates all of the elements required under the
INA, asylum is an essentially discretionary
22remedy, and it should remain so in order to
maintain the flexibility required to respond to the
complex realities of refugees' situations.
Following the controversial ruling in the case of
In re R-A-, the Department of Justice (hereinafter
"DOJ") proposed a regulation attempting to provide
guidance to asylum adjudicators confronted with
issues of gender-based persecution.
23
Unfortunately, the proposed regulation, as currently
written, is deeply flawed. 24 Indeed, it may be better
for the cause of women asylum-seekers if that
regulation, which has languished in a pending state
for nearly four years, is never codified.
Nonetheless, the fact that women such as Rodi
Alvarado are not being granted asylum
demonstrates the need to provide clearer guidance
to asylum adjudicators and judges, who must be
informed about the realities of gender
discrimination and how the existing law can address
them. This Article contends that such guidance
should come in the form of clearer regulations
interpreting the existing law, rather than statutory
amendment or any other proposed solutions.
21 Anita Sinha, Note, Domestic Violence and U.S. Asylum
Law: Eliminating the "Cultural Hook "for Claims Involving
Gender-Related Persecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1562, 1591
(2001).
22 See CHARLES GORDON ET AL., 3-33 IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE §§ 33.05[31[b][iii], 34.02[111], 34.02[12][d].
23 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588
(Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
24 The specific flaws in the DOJ regulation are discussed in
more depth in another part of this Article. See infra Part II.C.
8
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Part II of this Article surveys the current state of
U.S. asylum law and identifies the sources of
problems for women seeking asylum on gender-
based grounds. Part III investigates the theoretical
underpinnings of power and gender. Part III
concludes that, if redrafted statutory or
administrative materials are to advance the position
of women refugees, they must take into account the
most current understanding of issues underlying the
inequitable treatment of women seeking asylum.
Domestic or personal violence must be understood
as essentially political because of the power
relations implicated between men and women in
patriarchal societies. Part IV considers proposed
solutions to the problem of gender disparity in
asylum decisions and evaluates their potential to
create a more egalitarian system of asylum
adjudication.
II. Asylum Law in the United States
In order to understand the quandary of women
making gender-based asylum claims, it is necessary
to understand, in some detail, the underpinnings and
mechanics of asylum law. Asylum and refugee law
must incorporate aspects of international law into
domestic law in a manner that adheres to the
mandates of each. The BIA described the essential
purpose of this body of law as "provid[ing]
surrogate international protection where there is a
fundamental breakdown in state protection., 25 The
federal courts are, in a sense, standing in for an
international tribunal.26
25 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 912.
26 Of course, wherever international law informs, or attempts
to inform, domestic law, a jurisdictional tension is created
9
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Generally, U.S. asylum law could benefit from a
re-examination of the principles of international law
from which it arose, as well as how those principles
between the two. See generally BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP
R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 2003); LORI F.
DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 2001). See
also Andrew L. Strauss, Where America Ends and the
International Order Begins: Interpreting the Jurisdictional
Reach of the U.S. Constitution in Light of a Proposed Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction and Satisfaction of Judgments, 61
ALB. L. REv. 1237, 1248 n.63 (1998) (quoting Murray v. The
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804))
("[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations, if any other possible construction
remains."); Lisa Cox, Comment, The Legal Limbo of
Indefinite Detention: How Low Can You Go?, 50 AM. U. L.
REv. 725, 753 n.164 (2001) (noting that a properly-enacted,
constitutional domestic law will displace a conflicting
international law if the purpose of enacting the new domestic
law is specifically to supersede the international law); W.
Fletcher Fairey, Comment, The Helms-Burton Act: The Effect
of International Law on Domestic Implementation, 46 AM.
U.L. REv. 1289 (1997).
The charge upon the immigration courts, then, is to
adjudicate asylum petitions with regard to both domestic and
international mandates by giving appropriate consideration to
each. According to some scholars, this relative independence
of U.S. federal and international law can be beneficial for
refugees. For example, Deborah Anker, described the
relationship between the international and domestic law
characteristics of refugee law as uniquely suited to "avoid[]
controversies that have been most sensitive and divisive in
debates concerning ... cultural relativism in general."
Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human
Rights Paradigm, 15 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 133, 146 (2002).
Professor Anker lauds the fact that refugee law "does not
attempt to set a corrective agenda, tell another country how to
act, or propose plans for eradicating particular practices,"
thereby avoiding "debates within the [international] human
rights community [that] have been, at times, almost




have been fleshed out in case law in a manner that
has perpetuated some of the gender biases inherent
in the underlying international instruments27 and the
cases themselves. 28 First, though, it is necessary to
understand how the law of asylum operates.
A. History of Refugee Status Based on
Gender
The first step toward a grant of asylum is
proving that one meets the legal criteria of a
refugee. Although proving refugee status by itself
is an insufficient basis for asylum, establishing such
status is a prerequisite for a successful asylum
application. The Refugee Convention of 195129
was the first international treaty to include a
definition of "refugee." According to Article 1A(2)
of the Refugee Convention, the term "refugee"
applies to:
[Any person who] owing to well
founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that
27 See supra note 2.
28 Nancy Kelly points out that the development of asylum law
has taken place primarily through the cases of male applicants,
meaning that most existing case law involves the examination
of activities traditionally dominated by males. Kelly, supra
note 2, at 636.
29 The Refugee Convention of 1951, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
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country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to return to it.
30
It is important to note that, despite comprising the
majority of refugees in the world,3' women are not
mentioned anywhere in this definition. Not only do
they not appear as a protected class, reference to
gender does not even merit inclusion as a pronoun.
This oversight was not unusual for the 1950s, a time
during which patriarchal culture was well
entrenched and little questioned in most of the
32world. Nonetheless, many of the current problems
women face during the asylum process can be
attributed, at least in part, to the fact that a
definition created without regard for the gendered
reality of refugee situations has become the model
for so many others.
33
Although the United States is not a signatory to
the Refugee Convention, the United States did sign
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, which required the implementation of the
30 Id. at Art. 1A(2). The 1951 Convention applied only to
people affected by events taking place before January 1, 1951.
31 See supra note 2.
32 "[The drafters of the Refugee Convention] did not
deliberately omit persecution based on gender-it was not
even considered." Judith Kumin, Gender: Persecution in the
Spotlight, 2:123 REFUGEES 12 (2001), available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/1951convention/gender.html (last visited
May 19, 2004).
33 Andrea Binder, Gender and the "Membership in a
Particular Social Group " Category of the 1951 Refugee
Convention, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 167, 170 (2001);
Condon, supra note 6, at 214; Kelly, supra note 2, at 627.
12
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language of the Refugee Convention in U.S.
domestic laws.34 It was not until thirteen years
later, when Congress was in the process of revising
the procedure of admitting refugees into the United
States, that language resembling the Refugee
Convention's definition of "refugee" was
incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality
Act 35 via the Refugee Act of 1980 (hereinafter
"Refugee Act").
36
B. The Current Landscape of U.S. Asylum
Law
The language used in the Refugee Act is similar
to that used in the Refugee Convention,37 meaning
34 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,
19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791
(hereinafter "Protocol"). The Protocol was drafted in response
to the Refugee Convention's failure to protect people who
became refugees as a result of events taking place after
January 1, 1951. It made the Convention's provisions
applicable to displaced persons regardless of the date of the
displacing events. Cf note 29.
15 § 101(a)(42)(A) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§
1 101(a)(42)(A)(2004)).
36 The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102
(codified as amended in various sections of 8 U.S.C.).
37 The term "refugee" is defined in the Refugee Act as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or
457
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that the U.S. standard conforms with the
international standard and shares in its benefits as
well as its shortcomings. Having an asylum
decisionmaker determine that an asylum applicant
fits within the definition of "refugee" is only a
preliminary step toward attaining asylum under U.S.
law.38 Successful applicants must also prove that
they are unwilling or unable to return to their home
country because they have suffered past persecution
or have a well-founded fear of future persecution on
account of one of the five protected characteristics,
race, religion, nationality, political beliefs, or
membership in a particular social group. 39 Further,
applicants must show that their persecution was
either directly caused or indirectly condoned by the
government of that country. n
1. Persecution requirement
To gain asylum, it is not sufficient to
demonstrate that conditions in the applicant's
country of origin are generally oppressive. An
applicant must also demonstrate that she has been
persecuted in the past or that she has a "well-
political opinion.
INA § 101(a)(42)(A). The resemblance to the language of the
Refugee Convention was a deliberate decision of Congress,
which explicitly stated its intent to adopt the Convention's
definition. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-781, at 19 (1980).38 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 443 (1987)
(stating that "an alien who satisfies the applicable standard
under § 208(a) does not have a right to remain in the United
States; he or she is simply eligible for asylum, if the Attorney
General, in his discretion, chooses to grant it") (emphasis in
original).
39 INA § 101(a)(42)(A).40id.
14
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founded fear of persecution" for the future.4' If an
applicant bases her claim on past persecution, she
may still have to demonstrate that she would be in
danger if she returned to her home country.42 This
breaks down into two elements that must be proven
in order to meet eligibility requirements: (a) a
"well-founded fear" and (b) "persecution."
a. Well-founded Fear
The United States Supreme Court has set out a
two-pronged test for the "well-foundedness" of an
applicant's fear, which involves both an objective
and subjective component.43 The subjective
component requires the applicant to establish to the
adjudicator's satisfaction that the applicant actually
experienced fear. If actual fear is established, the
objective component requires that the adjudicator
assess the reasonableness, or well-foundedness, of
41Id. See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). When an applicant
demonstrates past persecution, she is eligible for asylum.
Asylum may still be denied as a matter of the adjudicator's
discretion, however, if it does not appear that the applicant is
very likely to suffer further persecution if she returns to her
home country. The B.I.A. held in In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec.
16 (1989), that an asylum adjudicator can be justified in
exercising a favorable grant of discretion for humanitarian
reasons even when the likelihood of future persecution is slim.
42 The regulations interpreting the INA indicate that an
applicant who has suffered persecution in the past will be
presumed to have a fear of future persecution "unless a
preponderance of the evidence establishes that since the time
the persecution occurred conditions in the applicant's country.
. .have changed to such an extent that the applicant no longer
has a well-founded fear of being persecuted if he or she were
to return." Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)
(2003).
43 Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 431.
459
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the applicant's fear. An applicant's petition may be
granted only when she has adequately demonstrated
both components.
The objective component involves an inquiry as
to the essential rationality of the applicant's fear44
based on evidence presented by the applicant.45
The adjudicator must find that a reasonable person
would be fearful in similar circumstances.46
Acknowledging the difficulties applicants may
encounter in attempting to provide objective,
corroborative evidence, several courts have held
that it is not necessary to demonstrate actual
persecution in order to show objectively rational
fear. If the applicant can demonstrate that she is
44 id.
45 The applicant's proof must show that:
- the applicant possesses a characteristic or
belief that a persecutor seeks to overcome in
others by means of punishment (the evidence
need not show that the persecutor actually
harbors "punitive" or "malignant" intent);
- the persecutor is already aware, or could
become aware that the applicant possesses this
belief or characteristic;
- the persecutor has the capability of punishing
the applicant; and
- the persecutor has the inclination to punish the
applicant.
GORDON ET AL., supra note 21, at § 33.04[11[b][ii][B][II]
(citations omitted).
46 In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
47 See, e.g., INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425 (1984) ("The
well-founded-fear standard is more generous than the clear-
probability-of-persecution standard."); Cordon-Garcia v. INS,
204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) ("A well-founded fear may
be based on no more than a ten percent chance of actual
persecution.") (citing Velarde v. INS, 140 F.3d 1305, 1310
(9th Cir.1998)); Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1383-
16
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similarly situated to others who are "routinely
subject to persecution," her fear can be deemed
objectively rational.48
If the applicant's fear is found to be objectively
rational, the adjudicator then must move to the
subjective prong of the Supreme Court's test and
determine whether the applicant actually
experienced fear related to her persecution.49
Because discerning an applicant's subjective state
of mind is necessarily a more speculative endeavor
than determining the facts of country conditions, the
courts have given some guidance on what does and
does not qualify as a subjective experience of fear.
For example, the United States Supreme Court has
held that failing to apply for asylum in countries
through which an applicant has passed-or even in
which an applicant has resided and worked-on the
84 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the petitioner's testimony of a
threat of persecution is sufficient to establish a well-founded
fear of persecution). See also M.A. v. U.S. INS, 858 F.2d 210
(4th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.
1990).48 M.A., 858 F.2d at 214. The Ninth Circuit also observed that
proof of a well-founded fear is not necessarily precluded by:
(1) the absence of a showing that either the
applicant or any family member has actually
been harmed or harassed for political activities;
(2) the fact that he or she was able to obtain a
passport or exit visa; or (3) the fact that in
fleeing persecution, the applicant has sought
sanctuary in a country where he or she believes
the opportunities will be best.
GORDON ET AL., supra note 21, at §
33.04[1][b][ii][B][II] (citing Garcia-Ramos v. INS,
775 F.2d 1370, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1985)).
49 Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 431.
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way to the United States does not conclusively
prove an applicant's lack of fear.
50
b. Persecution
The INA contains no definition of
"persecution," but rather leaves the meaning of that
term to be determined on a case by case basis. Not
surprisingly, courts have formulated somewhat
conflicting definitions of what constitutes
persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals
has held that a punitive or malicious intent is not
required for an act to constitute persecution.5 The
Ninth Circuit found that cumulative experiences
may add up to persecution. 52 In one of the more
precise definitions, the Seventh Circuit deemed
persecution to be "punishment or the infliction of
harm for political, religious, or other reasons that
this country does not recognize as legitimate. 53
Several courts have agreed that one of the
characteristics distinguishing persecution from
merely annoying or harassing conduct is its
egregiousness. The Seventh Circuit wrote that "the
conduct in question need not necessarily threaten
the petitioner's life or freedom; however, it must
rise above the level of mere harassment to constitute
persecution. ' 54 The Ninth and Third Circuits
50 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
51 Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. at 365.
52 Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 1998).
53 Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting
DeSouza v. INS, 999 F.2d. 1156, 1158 (7th Cir. 1993)).
54 Sofinet v. INS, 196 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal
quotations omitted). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
similarly opined that "persecution does not require bodily
harm or a threat to life or liberty." Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d
18
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similarly noted that "[p]ersecution is an extreme
concept that does not include every sort of treatment
our society regards as offensive. 55
2. The "On Account Of" Requirement
Even if an applicant makes a sufficient showing
of well-founded fear, the applicant's petition can
succeed only when she can prove that she was
targeted for persecution "on account of' her race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group. 56 If an
applicant is unable to demonstrate that the
persecution was directed toward her because she
possessed or was perceived to possess 57 one of the
962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723,
726-27 (9th Cir. 1988)).
55 Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995); Fatin v.
INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d. Cir. 1993).
56 These five categories together constitute the so-called
"protected categories." Although the meaning of each of these
five categories has been litigated, the "social group" category
has been the subject of far more attention than the others. See
discussion infra Part H.B.4.
57 Because the prevailing concern is whether the asylum
applicant was actually in fear, the Supreme Court suggested in
.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1992), that
protection may be warranted even when a persecutor has
falsely or mistakenly imputed a political opinion to the asylum
applicant. Numerous Circuit Courts of Appeals have
subsequently affirmed the "imputed political opinion"
doctrine. See, e.g., Ravindran v. I.N.S., 976 F.2d 754, 760 (1st
Cir. 1992) ("An imputed political opinion, whether correctly
or incorrectly attributed, may constitute a reason for political
persecution within the meaning of the Act.") (quoting
Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990)); DeBrenner
v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 629, 635-36,(8th Cir. 2004) (considering
that "the political views the persecutor rightly or in error
attributes to [a] victim[ ]. If the persecutor attributed a
463
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five characteristics explicitly set forth in the statute,
she is ineligible for asylum. 58 The causal
relationship required between the protected
characteristic and persecution has frequently been
referred to as the "nexus" requirement, and the
problems inherent in attempting to demonstrate a
persecutor's state of mind have been the subject of
much scholarly attention.
59
political opinion to the victim, and acted upon the attribution,
this imputed view becomes the applicant's political opinion as
required under the Act.") (quoting Sangha v. I.N.S., 103 F.3d
1482, 1489 (9th Cir. 1997)). See generally Joseph J. Bassano
et al., Political Opinion Imputed to Alien by Persecutor, AM.
JUR. ALIENS § 1248 (2004).
58 Some courts have recognized that even when an applicant is
unable to demonstrate a nexus between one of the protected
characteristics and the persecution, she may still be entitled to
some protection under the United Nations' Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, art. 3,
available at http://ohcr.org/english/law.cat.htm [hereinafter
"Torture Convention"]. See, e.g., Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d
1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The inability to state a
cognizable asylum claim does not necessarily preclude relief
under the Convention Against Torture."). See also the INS
application of the Torture Convention at 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)
(2005).
5 9 See, e.g., Michelle Foster, Causation in Context:
Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee Convention, 23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 265 (2002) (examining different standards of
causation in refugee law; comparing them to those in tort,
equity, and anti-discrimination law; and concluding that the
standard's inadequate definition has led to inconsistent asylum
determinations); James C. Hathaway, International Refugee
Law: The Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention
Ground, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207 (2002) (proposing rules by
which to interpret the nexus requirement); Karen Musalo,
Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections
from Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1179, 1182
(1994) (contending that the nexus requirement "places an
20
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The nexus test first set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in 1NS v. Elias-Zacarias has
been called "one of the most demanding" in the
world for the burden it places on asylum
applicants. 61 The two-part test first requires the
applicant to show that she actually possesses the
protected characteristic on account of which she
alleges she was harmed.62 Next, the asylum
applicant herself must establish that her persecutor
was motivated by that characteristic. 63 This second
unrealistic evidentiary burden on the applicant, who must
divine the motivation of her persecutor and then carry the
burden of proof on this issue").
60 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
61 Karen Musalo, Beyond Belonging: Challenging the
Boundaries of Nationality: Revisiting Social Group and Nexus
in Gender Asylum Claims: A Unifying Rationale for Evolving
Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 777, 786 (2003).
Numerous countries have had to contend with this requirement
because of language in the Refugee Convention defining
refugees as those persecuted "for reasons of race, nationality,
religion, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion." Refugee Convention, supra note 29, Art. 1A(2). In
interpreting the Convention's language, courts in other
countries have developed tests that leave room for the
meaning of "nexus" to differ based on circumstances of the
case. These range from "sole cause" to "but-for" to
"contributing cause." Still other nations have left the term's
definition open entirely. Musalo, Beyond Belonging, supra at
789, n.68.
62 Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483.
63 Id. Elias-Zacarias was a young Guatemalan man who
feared he would be killed by anti-government guerrillas
because he had refused to join and fight with them. The
Supreme Court rejected his claim on grounds that he had not
proven that he would be killed or otherwise harmed by the
guerrillas on account of his political beliefs rather than his
refusal to participate in their fight. In effect, the court required
Elias-Zacarias to offer proof of his persecutor's state of mind,
a requirement that has been criticized for its unrealistic
465
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part of the Elias-Zacarias test effectively limits the
court's analysis to the relationship between the
individual perpetrator and the applicant.
Although the regulation proposed in the wake of
Rodi Alvarado's case has not been approved, its
implications for the nexus requirement bear
mention.64 The proposed regulation would require
applicants whose persecutors may have had mixed
motivations in persecuting them (such as domestic
abusers) to demonstrate that the persecutor was
primarily motivated by one of the enumerated
grounds under the INA.65 Trying to prove the of the
state of mind of a domestic abuser would create
numerous complications for an applicant's case.
66
expectation that an asylum applicant can mobilize such proof.
See Shayna S. Cook, Repairing the Legacy of INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 223 (2002); Musalo,
Irreconcilable Differences, supra note 61, at 1182.
64 See 65 Fed. Reg. 76588 (Dec. 7, 2000). Attorney General
John Ashcroft did state in testimony before the Senate in
March of 2003 that he would personally be reviewing this
regulation, so it may be enacted or rejected in the near future.65 Id. at 76592. The commentary accompanying the rule
describes the mixed motives requirement as follows:
[The proposed regulation] allows for the
possibility that a persecutor may have mixed
motives. It does not require that the persecutor
be motivated solely by the victim's possession of
a protected characteristic. It does, however,
require that the victim's protected characteristic
be central to the persecutor's decision to act
against the victim. For example, under this
definition it clearly would not be sufficient if the
protected characteristic was incidental or
tangential to the persecutor's motivation.
Id.
66 For discussion of these potential complications, see Condon,
supra note 6, at 235-38; Christina Glezakos, Domestic
22
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3. The State Action Requirement
In order to meet the "state action" requirement,
an applicant must demonstrate that agents of her
country's government, or a person or group the
government is unwilling or unable to control,
actually persecuted or threatened her with
persecution.67 The requirement of state
involvement is thus directly bound up with the
definition of persecution. A government is said to
be "unable or unwilling to control" actions taken
against a citizen when, among other things, an
asylum applicant can demonstrate a pattern of
Violence and Asylum: Is the Department of Justice Providing
Adequate Guidance for Adjudicators?, 43 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 539, 562-63 (2003).
67 See, e.g., In re Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142, 147 (B.I.A.
1990); In re H-, 211. & N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996); Kasinga,
211. & N. Dec. at 365; In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 222-
23 (B.I.A. 1985). These decisions are consistent with the
position taken by the Handbook for determining refugee status
under the Refugee Convention and Protocol, written by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as
with the discussions that took place in Congress before
passage of the Refugee Act. See Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, The Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees 65 (Geneva, 1979), available at
http://www.asylumsupport.info/publications/unhcr/handbook.
htm [hereinafter "UNHCR Handbook" or "Handbook"]; H.R.
REP. 95-1452 at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4700, 4704 (defining "persecution" as "the infliction of
suffering or harm, under government sanction"). Note that the
House Report includes the state action requirement as a
necessary element of persecution.
467
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governmental unresponsiveness to her situation.
68
Although governments are not expected to
safeguard each citizen from all harms at all times,
they are expected "to take reasonable steps to
control the infliction of harm or suffering," as
reflected in their policies.
69
4. The Social Group Requirement
The language "membership in a particular social
group" was added to the INA in 1980 along with the
rest of the definition of "refugee" from the Refugee
Convention. 70 Social group is not defined in the
INA itself, and the legislative history of the statute
does not shed any light on what the legislature
intended the term to mean.71 The courts, therefore,
have been left to determine the legal contours of the
68 Mgoian v. INS, 184 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). See
also In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (B.I.A. 2000)
(holding that attempts to seek protection from the government
were unnecessary to a successful petition for asylum where
applicant demonstrated that such attempts would be not only
futile, but also potentially dangerous).
69 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76591 (Dec. 7, 2000) (quoting §
208.15(a)(1) of proposed rule). Country conditions and
applicants' circumstances may bear on what constitutes
adequate access to government protection. In some countries,
for example, a woman who is abused by her husband may be
able to gain state protection when she has the support of other
family members, whereas a woman without such support
would be able to obtain only more limited protections.
Asylum adjudicators are instructed to consider such
circumstances in their evaluations of whether a state is
complicit in the persecution. Id.70 INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).
71 See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239 (discussing the lack of legislative
history on social group).
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term on a case-by-case basis, resulting in somewhat
incongruent definitions of "particular social group."
For example, the Seventh Circuit case of
Bastanipour v. INS defined a social group as a
people targeted because of their disloyalty to the
72ruling regime. The First Circuit, however,
adopted a broader definition and held that social
groups are comprised of people sharing "a
characteristic that either is beyond the power of an
individual to change or... that it ought not be
required to [change]. 73
The size or potential size of a social group has
been given some attention as a basis for defining the
group. The Ninth Circuit, for example, concluded
that "[m]ajor segments of the population of an
embattled nation, even though undoubtedly at some
risk from general political violence, will rarely, if
ever, constitute a distinct 'social group' for the
purpose of establishing refugee status., 74 Some
jurists argue that a group ceases to be a "social
group" if it is comprised of too large a segment of
the population.
75
72 Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir. 1992).
Note that this definition resembles that in the UNHCR
Handbook, supra note 67, at 77-78, which states that social
group membership may be the reason for persecution when the
group's ideology conflicts with that of the government.
73 Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir.
1985).
74 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (9th Cir.
1986).
75 See, e.g., In reH-, 211. & N. Dec. at 350 (Board Member
Heilman, dissenting) ("For all intents and purposes, the
majority has concluded that all persons who have been harmed
or who fear harm due to civil war will be entitled to asylum in
the United States .... Indeed, if one pursues the majority's
logic, all warring sides persecute one another, and this means
that all civil wars are nothing more than acts of persecution.").
469
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The most concerted effort to define "social
group" occurred in In re Acosta.76 The Acosta court
examined the other four bases of persecution in the
INA, and found that each of them was either
impossible for the individual to change or "so
fundamental to individual identity or conscience
that it ought not to be changed or required to be
changed.,77 Using the doctrine of ejusdem
generis,78 the Board of Immigration Appeals held:
[The social group category
encompasses] persecution that is
directed toward an individual who is a
member of a group of persons all of
whom share a common, immutable
characteristic. The shared characteristic
See also Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1242-43 ; Safie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636,
640 (8th Cir. 1994). In both Fatin and Safie, the courts
rejected asylum applications from Iranian women at least in
part on grounds that the social group comprised of Iranian
women persecuted under the ruling regime was too broad a
group definition.
However, it is worth nothing that the majority opinion in
In re H- rejected the position that a social group cannot be
defined so as potentially to render enormous numbers of
people eligible for asylum, noting that every member of a
social group, no matter how large, must individually prove his
eligibility for asylum. 211. & N. Dec. at 343.
76 19 I. & N. Dec. 211. The case involved a Salvadoran taxi
driver who claimed he was a member of a taxi cooperative
targeted for violence by guerrillas after he and his fellow
drivers refused to participate in a strike.77 Id. at 233.
78 Ejusdem generis is a canon of statutory construction
defined as follows: "When a general word or phrase follows a
list of specific persons or things, the general word or phrase
will be interpreted to include only persons or things of the




might be an innate one such as sex, color
or kinship ties, or in some circumstances
it might be a shared past experience such
as military leadership or land
ownership.
79
In 1996 the BIA explicitly recognized that
gender may constitute an element of a social group
with In re Kasinga. In that case, the INS agreed
with the applicant's characterization of female
genital mutilation (hereinafter "FGM") as "'based
on the manipulation of women's sexuality in order
to assure male dominance and exploitation, ' 81 even
though the practice could be construed from one
perspective as having "subjectively benign intent."
82
The court held that FGM was a form of persecution
79 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
80 211. & N. Dec. at 365-66. See B.J. Chisholm, Comment,
Credible Definitions: A Critique of U.S. Asylum Law's
Treatment of Gender-Related Claims, 44 How. L.J. 427, 432
n. 19 (2001) (citing FAUZIYA KASSINDJA, Do THEY HEAR YOU
WHEN YOU CRY (1998)). The Chisholm Article refers to the
woman by the proper spelling of her name, Fauziya Kassindja
(which was misspelled by the immigration judge and the
BIA), but to the case by its codified misspelling. Kassindja
was a young woman who fled her native Togo because she
was afraid she would soon be subjected to the female genital
mutilation (FGM) common to the women of her tribe. The
perpetrators of the feared harm in this case were the tribal
elders who would perform the rite, which posed a problem vis-
A-vis the Elias-Zacarias nexus test insofar as the elders
ostensibly did not intend to harm Kassindja, per se. Instead,
they believed that they were helping her take part in a
culturally important rite of passage.
81 Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. at 366 (quoting Nahid Toubia,
Female Genital Mutilation: A Callfor Global Action 9, 42
(Gloria Jacobs, ed. 1993) (quoting Raqiya Haji Dualeh
Abdalla, Somali Women's Democratic Organization)).
82 Id. at 367.
471
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directed at Kassindja on account of her membership
in a social group comprised of "young women of
the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had
FGM, aspracticed by that tribe, and who oppose the
practice.
Despite the fact that FGM is imposed on all the
girls in the Tchamba-Kunsutu tribe precisely
because they are female, the BIA declined to find
that the social group targeted for persecution was
comprised simply of the tribe's female members.
This is another example of the courts' enforced
gender-blindness which has compelled asylum
litigators to craft ever more intricate descriptions of
persecuted groups to attempt to fit persecution
against women into the statutory requirements. 84 It
is the same error the court would later repeat in the
case of Rodi Alvarado. But a recent case from the
Ninth Circuit may signal broader recognition of
gender-based persecution as grounds for asylum.
The case of Mohammed v. Gonzales85 was the first
to expressly recognize that all female citizens of a
country can comprise a particular social group
under U.S. law, at least when persecution against
females is "deeply imbedded in the culture
throughout the nation and performed on
approximately 98 percent of all females."86 The
83 Id. at 368. The Ninth Circuit recently rejected the
requirement that an applicant demonstrate opposition to FGM
in order to be eligible for asylum, writing that FGM is
inflicted on women not because of women's opposition to the
practice, but because of their femaleness. See Mohammed v.
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 n.16 (9th Cir. 2005).84 See infra note 86.
85 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005).
86 Somali national Khadija Mohamed applied for asylum on
the basis that she had been forced to undergo FGM. Her
attorneys crafted a definition of social group based on the
28
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Ninth Circuit's reasoning in this recent decision
may herald a shift toward broader recognition of
gender-based persecution as grounds for asylum,
and at the least will permit more realistic
descriptions of groups of persecuted women.
C. Limitations of Gender as a "Particular
Social Group"
Once they have overcome the hurdle of proving
persecution, most refugees seeking asylum on
gender-based grounds have argued that the
treatment to which they were subjected was directed
at them on account of their gender. To be able to
bring a claim under the INA, an asylum seeker must
show that the perpetrators of the mistreatment
would direct their actions toward anyone in the
group of which she is a member. This means that
such asylum seekers have had to argue that women
comprise a social group, usually within certain
social or political confines.
87
definition from Kasinga involving her status as a female
member of her particular tribe, but the court explicitly rejected
the narrower description, favoring a social group defined
simply as females from Somalia. "Although we have not
previously expressly recognized females as a social group, the
recognition that girls or women of a particular clan or
nationality (or even in some circumstances females in general)
may constitute a social group is simply a logical application of
our law." Id. at 797 (footnote omitted).
87 See, e.g., In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918 (BIA 2001)
(holding that the group comprised of "Guatemalan women
who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions, who believe that women are to live under male
domination" is not a legitimate social group under the INA);
Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. at 368 (holding viable the social
group comprised of "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu
Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and
473
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The inconsistent results engendered by this
approach prompted the Director of the INS Office
of International Affairs to issue a memorandum to
Asylum Officers in 1995 "to provide the INS
Asylum Officer Corps with guidance and
background on adjudicating cases of women having
asylum claims based wholly or in part on their
gender." 88 These guidelines do acknowledge that
women "may... have had experiences particular to
their gender," and directly state that "rape
(including mass rape in, for example, Bosnia),
sexual abuse and domestic violence, infanticide and
genital mutilation ... may serve as evidence of past
persecution on account of one or more of the five
grounds." 89 However, they do not give any
substantial guidance on how adjudicators should
frame gender-specific violence in terms of the
protected categories, nor do they give any guidance
for avoiding stereotyping of gender-based claims. 90
who oppose the practice"); Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241 (suggesting
that the group comprised of "Iranian women who refuse to
conform to the government's gender-specific laws and social
norms" may constitute a social group). But see In re D-K-, at
§ V. 7, available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/ij/117.html (interpreting
the Fatin case to contain dicta that "gender, in and of itself,
may be the defining characteristic of a particular social
group").
8 Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of International
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All INS Asylum Office/rs
Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Claims from
Women 1 (May 26, 1995), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/guidelines/us.pdf (last
visited on May 21, 2004) [hereinafter "DOJ Guidelines"].89 Id. at 4.
90 See Diana Saso, The Development of Gender-Based Asylum
Law: A Critique of the 1995 INS Guidelines, 8 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 263, 282 (1997) (contending that the DOJ
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Perhaps the most important aspect of the DOJ
Guidelines, however, is the fact that they are non-
binding against any court or adjudicator. The
memorandum's author subsequently testified before
the House Committee on International Relations
that the Guidelines "do not enlarge or expand the
grounds for asylum that were specified by Congress
and the understanding the courts have reached about
those grounds." 91
Also problematic is the courts' focus on the size
of the group implicated in particular definitions of
"social group. ' ' 92 The courts' decision to reject
definitions of social groups which, in their view,
include too many people has been especially
burdensome to women fleeing domestic abuse or
other violence because of their gender. 93 Women in
those types of situations have the most difficulty
meeting the evidentiary requirements to prove they
qualify for asylum under the NA due to the nature
of the crimes committed against them.
While the courts' reluctance to open the
proverbial floodgates is understandable, the concern
that acknowledging gender-based violence as a
ground for asylum would result in a flood of
Guidelines fail to educate officers as to why women's gender-
based claims are susceptible to unfair stereotyping, such as the
assumption that sexual violence against a woman is caused by
the woman); Condon, supra note 6, at 217.
91 Victims of Torture: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Int '1 Relations, Subcomm. on nt 'l Operations and Human
Rights, 104th Cong. (May 8, 1996) (testimony of Phyllis A.
Coven, Director of International Affairs, Immigration and
Naturalization Service). Available at 1996 WL 10164383.
92 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
93 For discussion of the different forms of violence against
women, see infra Part III.
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immigrants is misplaced.94 As discussed above,
even when an asylum applicant meets all criteria for
a grant of asylum, asylum remains a discretionary
remedy under U.S. immigration law. 95 Moreover,
courts should be evaluating cases based on their
individual merit, not on the total number of people
potentially affected. If the evidence shows that men
in a particular country abuse their wives on account
of their gender, the courts should recognize that
conclusion.96 Ignoring such a fact would mean
adjudicating asylum cases based on the number of
refugees implicated rather than on legitimate
interpretation of the INA.9 7 If, despite current
trends, an increase in the number of asylees
becomes a legitimate concern, Congress should
address the issue by enacting new measures
applicable to all asylum applicants, rather than
immigration judges on a case-by-case basis.
98
94 Canada, for example, recognizes gender-based persecution
as sufficient for membership in a particular social group, yet it
has not experienced a surge of asylees claiming such. See
Arthur C. Helton & Alison Nicoll, Female Genital Mutilation
as Ground for Asylum in the United States: The Recent Case
of In re Fauziya Kasinga and Prospects for More Gender
Sensitive Approaches, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 375,
387 (1997).
95 See supra note 22, at 34.02[12][d].96 See Condon, supra note 6, at 232.97 See Rex D. Khan, Why Refugee Status Should Be Beyond
Judicial Review, 35 U.S.F. L. REv. 57, 71-74 (2000) (arguing
that the United States justifies the number of refugees it
admits based on political interests rather than humanitarian
concerns).
98 See Condon, supra note 6, at 233-34 ("Allowing judges to
turn a blind eye to valuable evidence of motive is not a fair
solution to fears of opening the refugee floodgates and would




III. Linking Gender and Persecution
In perhaps every human society, social status
equates to power. Social standing is derived from a
complex combination of factors that may include,
inter alia, length of time or "establishment" in a
community, wealth, family, religious preference, or
political opinion. By any such measure, most
women refugees arriving in the United States fall at
the bottom of the social pile-among the most
disempowered of the disempowered. Observing the
workings of immigration courtrooms, one study
concluded that power differences can account for
bias in immigration courts and law.99 The
following discussion of gender and power theory
will shed light on why certain women who are
fleeing situations of gender-based violence are
being denied asylum, and also why the decision to
deny them the protections of U.S. asylum law is
illogical and unacceptable.
A. Categories of Violence
In all parts of the globe, women are subjected to
gender-based violence, but different types of
violence against women have potentially different
ramifications for the law. The most important
distinction to understand is that "' [t]he concept of
women being persecuted as women is not the same
as women being persecuted because they are
99 Nancy Ann Root & Sharyn A. Tejani, Note, Undocumented:
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women."'"00 To put it another way, some acts of
violence may be specific (if not exclusive) to one
gender without being inspired by the victim's
gender. Such violence fits into one of a few basic
categories: harm that can be done only to women,
10 1
harm that is more commonly inflicted on women
than on men,1°2 and harm inflicted on women
because they are women. 03 Legislatures and courts
address each category of violence somewhat
differently.
The first type of violence, which involves harm
that can be done only to women's bodies, is
relatively easy to recognize as being committed
based on gender. The U.S. government
100 Binder, supra note 32, at 167 (quoting the Refugee
Women's Legal Group, Gender Guidelines for the
Determination of Asylum Claims in the UK § 1.11 (1998)).
See also Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Refugee
Women at Risk: Unfair US. Laws Hurt Asylum Seekers (2002)
("Around the world women often suffer persecution just
because they are female, and experience persecution
differently because they are women.").
101 Examples of harms that can only be inflicted upon women
are practices such as female genital mutilation and forced
abortion. Also included would be domestic violence directed
against uniquely female parts of the body, such as the abuse to
the genitalia suffered by Rodi Alvarado. See supra note 13
and accompanying text.
102 Types of violence that are more common, but not exclusive
to, women include domestic violence, trafficking, rape, and
other forms of sexual assault.
103 This sort of violence includes the overt enactment and
enforcement of state policies directed toward gender
subjugation such as those formerly practiced by the Taliban in
Afghanistan. However, this category also includes the subtle
acceptance of unwritten social policies or traditions that
demand gender dominance and submission, such as the
practice of honor killing or the routine killing of female
infants.
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acknowledges acts such as forced abortion and
FGM as problematic for women. However, this
recognition was given only once the U.S. culture
became more familiar with these practices."' Both
FGM and forced abortion have been addressed in
the INA, but the attention that these practices have
received has been insufficient to substantively
impact asylum seekers.'
0 5
104 While cultural unfamiliarity with certain practices against
women has sometimes been used to justify grants of asylum,
see Sinha, supra note 21, at 1565-66, such unfamiliarity has at
other times meant an uphill battle in getting U.S. law to
recognize these practices as persecution. Female genital
mutilation is such an example. Until the case of Fauziya
Kassindja, fear of FGM was not considered a basis for asylum.
Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. 357. While it is difficult to speculate
as to why a defacing practice that is by no means a recent
development would take so long to be widely recognized,
scholarly debates over the relativism of cultural mores
certainly played a role. Some have advanced the argument
that the fact that because FGM is accepted by the dominant
factions within the cultures in which it is practiced, it ought
not necessarily be construed as persecutory against members
of that culture. For an evaluation of such arguments,
including the tension between imposing international human
rights standards and respecting the cultural implications of
FGM, see Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital
Mutilation ": Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the
Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 1 (1995); Sinha, supra
note 20, at 1585.
105 FGM was incorporated into the INA by means of Pub. L.
106-386, Div. B, Title V, § 1513(a) (Oct. 28, 2000), which
allows for illegal immigrants to obtain legal status at the
Attorney General's discretion if they were victims of FGM.
This law only applies, however, if the act was committed on
U.S. soil and if the victim agreed to help prosecute the
perpetrator. Id. Such a provision obviously has no impact on
applicants for asylum who are subjected to or threatened with
FGM in their home countries, and who have to rely on the
Kasinga decision.
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The second type of violence involves harms that
are inflicted more frequently against women, but
which also can be done upon men. U.S. law has
criminalized many of these forms of violence, but
the law has not always recognized them as being
gender motivated. Acts of this type, such as rape,
are not always gender motivated, but it is generally
agreed that they spring at least in part from the
exercise of a power differential.10 6 The fact that
men may be victimized in similar ways
demonstrates that gender cannot be isolated as the
motivation for such violence. In societies that are
still largely patriarchal, however, the power
Forced abortion was included in the INA via Executive
Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13897 (April 11, 1990),
codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1101, Note, which directed the
Secretary of State and the Attorney General to give special
consideration to any alien who expressed fear of forced
abortion or coerced sterilization in her home country.
However, the case of Dong v. Slattery, 84 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.
1996), held that the Order did not have the force of law, thus
precluding its enforcement in the courts.
106 See, e.g., Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking
Refuge for Battered Immigrants in the Violence Against
Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 665, 666-67 (arguing that
lawmakers must recognize the dynamic of power and control
in domestic violence to enact effective solutions to it); Nancy
Kelly, supra note 2, at 640-41, 641 n.75 (identifying two of
the most pervasive problems in women's asylum cases as
adjudicators' difficulty conceptualizing forms of sexual abuse
as violence and their propensity to attribute personal
motivations to perpetrators of sexual persecution); Elizabeth
M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: The Power of
Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of
Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REv. 868, 892-96 (1996) ("Rape
as power refers to the ways men use sex and sexuality to
establish dominance."). See also Special Rapporteur's




differential may frequently translate into violence
committed by men against women.
The third type of violence, harm caused to
women because they are women, refers to
embedded cultural practices of violence against
women by which patriarchal structures are
reinforced. These types of situations, such as the
pervasive hostility toward Afghani women created
by the Taliban, are perhaps the most easily
conceived of as political for purposes of the INA.
Violence of this sort is, however, susceptible to
arguments of cultural relativism,'0 7 and its
pervasiveness sometimes makes it more difficult to
combat. The practice of systematic, mass rape in
the context of armed conflicts of recent decades is
another example.'
0 8
107 See Lewis, supra note 104.
108 Much has been written on the use of mass rape as gender-
based persecution (and even as a form of attempted genocide)
in times of armed conflict. For more on this subject, see, e.g.,
Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, supra note 26, at 142 (arguing
that rape was systematically carried out against women during
Haiti's 1991 coup d'etat because women "played an important
role in the formation of democratic institutions, because of
their status and role in helping civil society, because of
involvement in activities to improve local communities,
because of the political activities of male relatives-and
because they were left behind"); Binder, supra note 33, at 174
n.35 ("Forced pregnancy was part of the pervasive pattern of
gender crimes in the Bosnian war."); Richard J. Goldstone,
Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 277 (2002) (advocating the prosecution of mass rape as a
crime against humanity); Krishna R. Patel, Recognizing the
Rape of Bosnian Women as Gender-Based Persecution, 60
BROOK. L. REv. 929, 930 (1994) (arguing that "systematic
rape has become a tool of genocide and torture" in the Bosnian
conflict); Mattie L. Stevens, Student Article, Recognizing
Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gender as a
Sixth Refugee Category, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 179,
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B. Categories of Power
Scholars have increasingly looked to the
connection between violence and power for answers
to the fundamental questions of why certain types of
violence persist. Even international legal
documents have begun to recognize the connection
between the degree of women's empowerment and
the violence committed against them.' 09 However,
the term "power" is deployed with various
meanings in various contexts, so defining it is
197-98 (1993) (quoting from a European Community
investigation into the Bosnian conflict which found that rape
was a "policy of terror" which could not be viewed as
"incidental to the main purpose of the aggression, but as
serving a strategic purpose in itself.").
For a discussion of other examples of culturally
embedded and sanctioned violence, including female genital
mutilation, honor killing, and gender slavery, see Allen White,
Female Genital Mutilation in America: The Federal Dilemma,
10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 129, 151-53 (2001).
109 Although the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180
(Dec. 18, 1979) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter
"CEDAW"], contained no language about power, the
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,
drafted by the UN General Assembly in 1993, recognized:
[V]iolence against women is a manifestation of
historically unequal power relations between
men and women, which have led to domination
over and discrimination against women by men
and to the prevention of the full advancement of
women, and that violence against women is one
of the crucial social mechanisms by which
women are forced into a subordinate position
compared with men.




critical to understanding what a particular author
intends or legal document implies. Numerous
useful definitions have been formulated, so it is
worthwhile to examine several of them that are
relevant to asylum law.
1. Dominance-Subjugation and Patriarchy
Both individual and political power can be
wielded in ways that advance egalitarian ideals just
as much as they can be wielded to others' detriment.
To the extent that feminist jurisprudence has been
concerned with power relations, it has largely
focused on the type of power typical of patriarchy:
power used to dominate or subjugate another or
others. " 0 When men have power and dominance
by virtue of societal convention, this often translates
into men utilizing their power to subjugate women
as a class.
One of the primary ways in which domination is
enforced is through various forms of violence
against women. Such violence, according to
Charlotte Bunch, reinforces messages of
domination:
[S]tay in your place or be afraid.
Contrary to the argument that such
110 For discussion of the development of feminist
jurisprudence, see generally Hilary Charlesworth et al.,
Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L.
613 (1991); Deborah Rhode, Gender and Jurisprudence: An
Agenda for Research, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 521 (1987); Ann C.
Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay,
95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986); Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). For discussion of
feminist jurisprudence as specifically applied to asylum law,
see Musalo, supra note 60.
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violence is only personal or cultural, it is
profoundly political. It results from the
structural relationships of power,
domination, and privilege between men
and women in society. Violence against
women is central to maintaining those
political relations at home, at work, and
in all public spheres."'
The pervasive problem of domestic violence against
women is frequently cited as a paradigmatic
expression of male dominance and female
submission. 112
2. Relational Power
One envisioned alternative to dominance-type
power focuses on the relationship between the
111 Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as Human Rights:
Toward a Re-vision of Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 486,
490-91 (1990).
112 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Pendo, Recognizing Violence
Against Women: Gender and the Hate Crime Statistics Act, 17
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 157 (1994) (noting many attempts to
reconstrue gender-motivated violence committed against
women as having causes other than gender); Patricia A. Seith,
Note, Escaping Domestic Violence: Asylum as a Means of
Protection for Battered Women, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1804,
1843 (1997) (identifying pervasive domestic violence as a
"form of social control"); Kristin L. Taylor, Note, Treating
Male Violence Against Women as a Bias Crime, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 575, 594 (1996) (remarking that violence against women
is often utilized as a punishment for deviation from gender
stereotypes). See generally R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL
DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST THE
PATRIARCHY (1979); RICHARD A. STORDEUR & RICHARD




people involved in the power relation. The work of
psychologist Carol Gilligan has demonstrated that
the act of problem-solving is itself a gendered
process.13 Gilligan's work with children indicates
that, in solving hypothetical moral dilemmas, girls
tend to employ an "ethic of care,"1 14 whereas boys
tend to use an "ethic of rights."" 5 Although
psychological theory traditionally privileged the
type of reasoning used by the boys, some legal
scholars argue that no system of law can be truly
objective if it does so. It will simply reproduce
traditional, male reasoning without accounting for
the factors considered in "feminine" reasoning.
That system will fail to reflect and regulate reality
as we expect of a legal system. 116
Philosopher Sara Ruddick, one proponent of a
relational mode of thinking, states in way of
definition, "To be powerful is to have the individual
"13 See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT
(1982).114 /d. at 164. Girls in these experiments tended to explain
their analyses in terms evocative of relationships,
communication, responsibility, and context.
115 Id. at 164, 174. The boys' explanations of their analyses
tended to focus more on abstract terms of fairness, logic,
rationality, and winning, and less on relationships.
116 Gilligan herself writes, "The failure to see the different
reality of women's lives and to hear the differences in their
voices stems in part from the assumption that there is a single
mode of social experience and interpretation." GILLIGAN,
supra note 113, at 174. For an examination of the myriad
ways in which feminism has informed the law, including
critiques of Gilligan's position, see generally Charlesworth et
al., supra note 110. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia
in a Different Voice: Speculations on Women's Lawyering
Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Suzanna
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
485
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strength or collective resources to pursue one's
pleasures and projects.' ' 17 For Ruddick, the ideal
alternative to the dominance-subjugation paradigm
is to be found in the power a mother has over her
children. 118 In illustration of her point, she notes
how mothers' primary objectives for their children
revolve around nurturance and protection rather
than dominance and subjugation. 1 9 Reconceiving
our notions of what power entails to reflect the
nurturing power relation, argues Ruddick, is a
necessary precursor to realizing equality-not only
with regard to gender, but also to race, economic
standing, and other factors.
This relational understanding of power is useful
for its emphasis of both the social and individual
aspects of power. It also hearkens to the aim of
individual empowerment as the end of positive
power relations. Such an aim is consistent with the
goals of the basic international documents affirming
human rights, including the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,' the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,' 2 1 the International
"7 SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING 37 (1989).
118 For these purposes, Ruddick is focused on the function of
the relationship rather than the gender of the caretaker,
defining a "mother" as "a person who takes on responsibility
for children's lives and for whom providing child care is a
significant part of her or his working life." Id. at 40.
Obviously, this is an idealized portrait of motherhood, a
fact Ruddick candidly admits. She is careful to acknowledge
the disparity between mothers' wishes for themselves and
their children, and what they actually accomplish, but
ultimately focuses on the nature of the relationship rather than
the result of the childrearing as most important. Id.
20 G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948).
121 Opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 51, U.N.
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 122 but, perhaps foremost, the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women.'
23
3. Legal or Collective Empowerment
Lawyer and scholar Patricia Williams sees
rights conferred by law as "islands of
empowerment."' 124 Those who fall outside (or
between the lines) of legal definitions conferring
rights are the disempowered, according to this way
of thinking. Williams argues:
[T]he line between rights and no rights is
most often the line between dominators
and oppressors. Rights contain images
of power, and manipulating those
images, either visually or linguistically,
is central in the making and maintenance
of rights. In principle, therefore, the
more dizzyingly diverse the images that
are propagated, the more empowered we
will be as a society.
125
Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976).
122 Opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3,
1976).
123 CEDAW, supra note 109.
124 Patricia J. Williams, On Being the Object of Property (a
gift of intelligent rage), in THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS 216, 233 (1991).
125 Id. at 233-34.
43
488 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY VOL. I: 3
Williams' focus on a type of collective
empowerment provides a compelling contrast to the
rhetoric of individualism that pervades much
discussion of power. It also comports well with the
stated goals of international organizations and
treaties concerned with the advancement of
women. 126 In the framework suggested by
Professor Williams, the goal of the legislator should
be to ensure that the law, as written, accounts for
the greatest number of voices possible in order to
further empowerment of as many people as
possible. Immigration judges in such a system
would, ideally, be more conscious of the interface
between generally applicable laws and individuals
with their unique stories. They would be, perhaps,
more conscious of how each case was contributing
to a larger tapestry of case law and less moved by
the potential number of people implicated by their
decisions.
126 See, e.g., United Nations Fourth World Conference on
Women: Declaration and Platform for Action, reprinted in 35
I.L.M. 401, 407 (1996) ("Women's empowerment and their
full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of
society, including participation in the decision-making process
and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of
equality, development, and peace."); United Nations Inter-
Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality, Women 's
Empowerment in the Context of Human Security (1999) (last
visited April 18, 2004), at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/collaboration/finalco
mIm1999.htm (recommending a general strategy of
empowerment of women in order to improve human security);
United Nations Office of the Secretary General, Agenda for
Development: Empowerment of Women 124 (1997) (last
visited on March 3, 2004) at
http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/women.htm ("Empowering
women is essential for achieving the goals of sustainable
development centered on human beings.").
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4. Other Relevant Definitions
The UNHCR has chosen to define power in
terms of its effects on individuals. In its Guidelines
on Gender-Based Violence, the UNHCR succinctly
defines power as "the capacity to make
decisions."' 127 The Guidelines go on to frame
positive uses of power as those that "affirm ... self-
acceptance and self-respect [and], in turn, foster[]
respect and acceptance of others as equals."' 28 The
use of power to dominate "imposes obligations on,
restricts, prohibits and makes decisions about the
lives of others."'129 Focusing on effects upon
individual people may diminish, to some degree, the
collective aspect of domination. This oversight is
understandable, however, insofar as it facilitates
quantification of the effects of power relations, an
end which is vital to the UNHCR's mission of
monitoring refugee statistics and helping remedy
refugee situations around the globe.
IV. Understanding and Utilizing Power Theory
in Asylum Adjudication
If adjudicators properly understood the power
dynamics inherent in many forms of persecution of
women, asylum applicants fleeing forms of
persecution considered to be more personal than
political, and therefore outside the scope of the
protection of asylum, would benefit. If stereotypes
of domestic violence and rape as merely private
127 See UNHCR Gender-Based Violence Guidelines, supra
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violence were eliminated, the burden of proving the
causal nexus between persecution and a protected
ground would be significantly lowered for many
women. If adjudicators recognized that "the context
of a relationship between a man and a woman, in a
patriarchal culture' 130 can, in itself, be politically
charged, then courts would have no choice but to
interpret certain forms of persecution that are
currently deemed personal as being politically
based.
To accomplish this end, some advocate adding
gender to the INA as a sixth protected ground.
Then, women demonstrating they had been
persecuted on account of their gender would meet
the criteria for asylum.' 31 However, the costs of
pushing such an amendment through Congress
would be significant, as would be the effort to
adequately educate legislators for whom
immigration is but one of many issues competing
for attention. Furthermore, adding sex or gender as
130 Sinha, supra note 21, at 1594 (quoting a letter from Karen
Musalo & Stephen Knight, Center for Gender and Refugee
Studies, to Director of Policy Directives and Instructions
Branch, INS, at 8 (Jan. 18, 2001)) (hereinafter "CGRS
comments") (on file with the New York University Law
Review).
131 For a sampling of arguments for adding gender as a sixth
protected category to the INA, see Condon, supra note 6, at
250 (arguing that adding gender as a sixth category would
eliminate definitional barriers of social group, have a
psychological impact on adjudicators, and resolve the reliance
on the social group category for a variety of gender-based
claims); Emily Love, Equality in Political Asylum Law: For a
Legislative Recognition of Gender-Based Persecution, 17
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 133, 152 (1994); Mary M. Sheridan,
Comment, In Re Fauziya Kasinga: The United States has
Opened its Doors to Victims of Female Genital Mutilation, 71
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 433, 463 (1997).
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a sixth enumerated ground would not immediately
eliminate the source of the problem: the underlying
gender bias in the law and its adjudicators.1
32
Adjudicators could still potentially apply
stereotyped conceptions of gender-based violence to
deny asylum to women even if gender were in the
statute.
A more efficient and satisfactory solution would
be for the Department of Homeland Security to
enact a regulation, binding upon adjudicators,
interpreting the existing statute to account for the
fact that "private" violence can be politically
motivated. Because the regulation proposed in the
wake of Alvarado's case is so deeply flawed, an
entirely new directive should be drafted. That
directive should eliminate the additional burdens
imposed by the Alvarado regulation.133 Sinha
suggests that a new regulation should directly state
that "opinions concerning treatment or rights based
on gender, such as feminism, will be considered a
political opinion."' 134 This language is a good start,
but the new regulation should also educate
adjudicators about how to recognize and supersede
stereotypes in asylum cases involving violence
against women. It should specify that violence
against women is not merely a private matter but
also a political one implicating power relations
within a culture or society. The new regulation
should also give substantive guidance on how this
type of violence can qualify as political persecution.
132 See Anker, supra note 26, at 139.
133 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
134 Sinha, supra note 21, at 1594 n.176 (quoting from CGRS
comments at 9).
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V. Conclusion
Asylum case law contains numerous examples
of how courts have failed refugee women because
of their stereotyping and misconceptions about the
nature of violence against women. With the benefit
of regulations that account for the realities of
violence committed against women, the current
statutory scheme could more fairly adjudicate the
cases of women who seek refuge in the United
States from what has been considered "private"
violence that is outside the scope of the INA.
Women who risk everything to flee abusive
situations deserve to have their suffering
acknowledged as persecution, regardless of whether
it is race, religion, or their gender, in combination
with their cultural provenance, that caused them to
be targeted for persecution.
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